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The real cost of going green – renewable energy is cheaper than you think and more expensive than you are told

Last reviewed: 18 November 2026

In the winter of 2022, British households opened their energy bills and found them nearly doubled. The cause was a gas price shock triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, an event thousands of miles from British shores that landed directly on British kitchen tables. Four years later, history is repeating. Tensions in the Middle East have pushed wholesale gas prices higher again, and consumers are once more bracing for the impact.

At exactly the same moment, Britain is paying wind farms to do nothing. In 2025, the country spent £1.5 billion switching off turbines that were generating perfectly good electricity, electricity that could not be moved to where it was needed. In 2026 the bill has already passed that mark. According to Octopus Energy, it exceeded £1.5 billion on 5 October, three months earlier than in 2025. To many people, these two facts together sound like a damning verdict on the entire energy transition: renewables aren't reliable, and they are not even cheap. But that reading misses something important. Both problems have the same root cause, and understanding it tells you far more about where energy bills are heading than either headline figure does on its own.

At first glance, these two stories appear to contradict each other. One suggests renewable energy is creating expensive new problems. The other highlights the continuing cost of relying on fossil fuels. Much of the public debate confuses two very different questions. The first is how much it costs to generate electricity. The second is how much it costs to run an electricity system. They are not the same thing. Generating electricity from a modern wind farm has become remarkably cheap. Running an electricity system capable of delivering that power to millions of homes every second of every day is considerably more complex. It requires transmission networks, balancing services, backup generation and increasingly, technologies capable of storing electricity when supply exceeds demand.

This distinction explains why both supporters and critics of renewable energy can appear to be right at the same time. Wind and solar are now among the cheapest forms of electricity generation available. But building an electricity system around them requires investment that often receives far less attention.

As households face another period of energy price uncertainty, questions about the long-term role of renewable energy have become increasingly difficult to ignore. Renewables have been cushioning these blows, but they come with their own costs, and understanding those costs is essential to understand where energy prices go from here. The real question, then, is not whether renewable electricity is cheap. It is whether a renewable-based electricity system remains cheaper than one built around fossil fuels once all those additional costs are included. 

The answer is more nuanced than either side of the debate often suggests and understanding it tells us far more about where Britain's energy bills are heading than any single headline figure ever could.

Generation cost: are renewables winning? 

If the debate around renewable energy is so contentious, it raises an obvious question: why do so many economists, governments and energy analysts now agree that wind and solar are among the cheapest sources of electricity available? 

The answer lies in the way different power stations make electricity. The standard way to compare different energy technologies is the levelized cost of electricity, or LCOE. This measures the average cost of producing electricity over a plant's lifetime, considering capital costs, fuel costs, maintenance and the electricity output. 

By this measure, renewable energy has gained a significant advantage. Every time a gas-fired power station generates electricity, it must purchase fuel. Those costs fluctuate constantly and are heavily influenced by global markets, geopolitical events and supply disruptions. The 2022 energy crisis demonstrated just how quickly those costs can feed through into household bills and exposed just how vulnerable a fossil-fuel dependent system is to global events. The debate has taken on renewed urgency in recent months. Since tensions between the US, Israel and Iran escalated in late February 2026 and drove fears of a Strait of Hormuz disruption, Britain has been living through a live test of exactly the question this article asks. Ofgem raised the price cap by 4% for 1 October to 31 December 2026, and it attributed the rise to higher wholesale gas prices linked to the conflict in the Middle East. Bills remain well below the 2022 peak, when the government capped them at £2,500, but the episode shows once again that energy bills can be influenced by events thousands of miles from home.

On the other hand, wind and solar farms operate differently. While they require significant upfront investment, once built they generate electricity without the need to continually buy fuel. Their costs are largely paid upfront, meaning the price of producing electricity changes very little over the lifetime of the project. That distinction is one of the biggest reasons renewable generation has become increasingly competitive over the past decade. Further, as deployment has increased and technology has improved, costs have fallen rapidly. Offshore wind costs have fallen significantly since 2010, while solar power has become one of the cheapest sources of new electricity generation ever developed. According to the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ), new offshore wind projects are now expected to generate electricity at a lower cost than new gas-fired power stations. What was once an emerging technology supported by subsidies is increasingly able to compete on cost alone.

Additionally, the UK’s Contracts for Difference scheme has strengthened this advantage. Under the scheme, renewable generators agree a fixed strike price for the electricity they produce. If wholesale prices rise above that level, generators pay the difference back. If prices fall below it, they receive a top-up instead. The result is greater certainty for investors and more predictable costs for consumers. During the 2022 energy crisis, when wholesale electricity prices surged alongside gas prices, many renewable generators continued operating under these fixed-price contracts. This effectively returned hundreds of millions of pounds to energy suppliers that kept consumers costs down, simply because renewable generators were not exposed to the gas price that was setting the market rate for everyone else.

It's worth being upfront, though, that LCOE is not as clean a comparison as it first appears, and this is increasingly acknowledged even by renewable-energy researchers. LSE Grantham Institute has published directly regarding this limitation. LCOE treats every megawatt-hour as identical, regardless of when or where it's produced, which means it ignores the cost of backup generation, storage and grid investment needed to handle intermittency. A gas plant can generate on demand. A wind farm generates when the wind blows, which does not always coincide with when electricity is most needed. This doesn't make wind uneconomic, but it does mean that comparing LCOE figures directly between the two is a bit like comparing the cost of a taxi with the cost of a bus without factoring in that the bus only runs on certain routes at certain times. The integration costs that LCOE misses are essentially the cost of making the bus system work like a taxi service. OECD estimates these "integration costs" can add $25-30/MWh on top of the headline LCOE in systems with a high share of renewables. 

However, every unit of electricity generated by wind or solar power reduces the need to buy fuel from global markets, helping to improve both energy security and price stability. At this point, the case for renewable generation looks compelling. If producing electricity from wind and solar is now cheaper than producing it from gas, it would seem the debate should be settled. It isn't. Because generating electricity is only half the story. The real challenge is delivering that electricity to the places where it is needed, exactly when it is needed.

The balancing problem

At this point, the criticism almost writes itself. If wind and solar have become some of the cheapest ways to generate electricity, why is Britain spending billions paying renewable generators not to produce it? The answer lies not in the turbines themselves, but in the network that carries their electricity.

Britain's transmission system was built for a very different energy landscape. For decades, electricity came primarily from large coal and gas-fired power stations located close to major towns, cities and industrial centres. Power flowed in predictable directions across a network designed around those stations. Today's system looks very different. Some of Britain's best renewable resources are found hundreds of miles from where most electricity is consumed. Scotland, in particular, has some of Europe's strongest and most consistent wind resources, making it the natural location for many of the country's largest offshore wind farms. 

The problem is that much of the demand is hundreds of miles away in England and the transmission network connecting the two was not designed for vast quantities of renewable generation. As a result, there are periods when more electricity is being generated than the grid can transport. When this happens, wind farms are instructed to reduce or stop generation, even though the wind is still blowing. Because these generators have already committed to producing electricity, they are compensated for the lost output. At the same time, gas-fired power stations located closer to demand centres are paid to increase generation to ensure homes and businesses continue receiving electricity. Many people imagine wind farms being switched off because there is "too much wind". In reality, the issue is usually that there is too much electricity trying to travel through one part of the transmission network at the same time. Wind farms submit bids to the balancing mechanism stating the compensation they would require to reduce their output, essentially a price list for turning down. NESO works through the cheapest bids first. The same process runs in reverse for replacement generation: gas plants submit their prices to increase output and NESO accepts the cheapest available. Consumers pay both sides of this transaction, the cost of switching wind down and the cost of switching gas up, which is why the headline curtailment bill always has two components.

One of the biggest bottlenecks is the B6 transmission boundary, the main corridor carrying electricity from Scotland into England. When forecasts show more electricity attempting to cross that boundary than the network can safely handle, the National Energy System Operator (NESO) instructs some generators north of the boundary to reduce their output. This process is known as curtailment, and it has become one of the most debated costs of the energy transition. Its impact becomes clearer when you look at individual sites. The boundary's capacity is not a fixed number. It changes depending on which transmission lines are in service, how much generation is running on either side, and a set of safety rules requiring that the grid can absorb the sudden failure of any single major circuit without causing wider problems. Planned maintenance work requires taking existing lines out of service temporarily, shrinking the effective capacity at exactly the moments when new wind farms are coming online and pushing more power toward the boundary. This creates a painful paradox: the work needed to solve the curtailment problem in the long run makes it temporarily worse in the short run.

The concentration of this problem is striking. According to Modo Energy, wind generation in North Scotland accounts for around 60 to 62% of total system-bid volume in the Balancing Mechanism. Rather than being spread evenly across the country, curtailment is heavily concentrated around Scotland's largest renewable assets, where enormous volumes of electricity are competing for limited transmission capacity. The scale of the problem reflects the speed of renewable deployment. As more renewable capacity has come online without equivalent expansion of the transmission network, the frequency and scale of curtailment has increased. Seagreen, Scotland's largest offshore wind farm, became Britain's most curtailed renewable asset in 2025, losing around 2.7 terawatt-hours of potential generation. Moray East and Moray West followed, losing 1.7TWh and 1.4TWh respectively. Together, they illustrate that curtailment is not spread evenly across the network; it is concentrated around a small number of highly productive wind farms sitting north of the main transmission bottlenecks. 

In 2025, Britain paid £380 million to Scottish wind farms to switch off  and then paid £1.08 billion to gas plants to generate the replacement electricity. Consumers funded both sides of that transaction.

Ofgem estimates constraint costs added around £15 to the average household bill in 2025, while the network upgrades designed to reduce those costs are expected to add around £60 per year by 2030. Without further investment, NESOestimates balancing costs could rise to between £4 billion and £8 billion annually by the end of the decade. However, it is important to distinguish between a problem with renewable energy and a problem with the infrastructure surrounding it. On the surface, those figures appear to undermine the economic case for renewable energy. But they also reveal something else.

The wind farms are doing exactly what they were built to do. They are generating large volumes of low-cost electricity whenever conditions allow. The bottleneck lies in the infrastructure built to move that electricity around the country. As renewable generation has expanded, another challenge has started to emerge. On particularly windy or sunny days, electricity supply can briefly exceed demand, causing wholesale electricity prices to fall sharply or even turn negative. For renewable generators, this reduces the average price they receive for their electricity, known as the capture price. It is another reminder that generating cheap electricity is only part of the challenge. The value of renewable power increasingly depends on whether the wider electricity system can absorb it when it is produced. In other words, Britain has not built too much wind. It has built renewable generation faster than it has expanded the network needed to use it.

That distinction matters because it changes the question entirely. The issue is no longer whether renewable electricity is cheap to generate. It is whether investing in new transmission infrastructure costs less than remaining dependent on fossil fuels for decades to come. Because the generation exists, it’s the infrastructure required to make full use of it that’s still catching up.

The whole system cost

If balancing costs are real and they clearly are, does that undermine the argument that renewable energy is cheaper? Not necessarily.

The problem is that generation costs and system costs are often treated as though they measure the same thing. They do not. Generation cost asks a relatively simple question: how much does it cost to produce a unit of electricity? Whole-system cost asks a much broader one: how much does it cost to operate a reliable electricity system capable of supplying power every hour of every day? That distinction matters because households do not pay for electricity generation alone. They pay for an entire system. Every electricity network requires transmission lines, reserve capacity, balancing services and enough flexibility to respond when demand suddenly changes. Those costs exist regardless of whether electricity comes from wind farms or gas-fired power stations. This is where critics of renewable energy make an important point. Looking only at the cost of generating electricity ignores those wider requirements. However, that criticism becomes less convincing if the comparison is made against an idealised fossil-fuel system.

Gas-fired electricity is not a cost-free benchmark. It also relies on extensive infrastructure, including pipelines, storage facilities, import terminals, balancing services and reserve generation. More importantly, every unit of electricity generated from gas requires more fuel to be purchased. Unlike a transmission upgrade, those fuel costs never disappear. They remain exposed to international markets and geopolitical events for as long as gas remains part of the system. This is why many energy economists increasingly focus on whole-system costs rather than generation costs alone. There is also a cost in the current system that rarely features in comparisons between renewable and fossil-fuel electricity: the capacity market. Britain operates a mechanism under which gas plants receive separate payments simply for remaining available during periods of peak demand, even if they never actually generate. It is, in effect, insurance against the grid running short on the coldest winter evenings. These payments exist because reliability has always carried a cost, regardless of whether the system is powered by renewables or fossil fuels. Looking only at renewable balancing costs while ignoring the cost of maintaining backup generation risks comparing the two systems on different terms.

It is reasonable to ask why Britain expanded renewable generation before expanding the network needed to support it. The answer lies partly in the different timescales involved. Wind farms can typically move from planning to operation within a few years. New high-voltage transmission infrastructure often takes a decade or more once planning approvals, environmental assessments and construction are taken into account. The result is that renewable generation has expanded more quickly than the network required to transport it.

Many of today's balancing costs are also linked to the current stage of the transition rather than the destination. This creates temporary inefficiencies, but it does not necessarily mean those costs will persist indefinitely. Several major transmission projects are already under construction, including subsea links designed to transport renewable electricity from Scotland to areas of higher demand in England. These are no longer abstract future plans, they are live construction projects with real budgets and dates. Eastern Green Link 1, a £2.5 billion, 196km subsea and onshore cable connecting Torness in Scotland to Hawthorn Pit in County Durham, broke ground in February 2025 and is targeting completion in 2029. Eastern Green Link 2, the larger of the two at £4.3 billion and over 500km, connecting Peterhead to Drax in Yorkshire, started construction in September 2024, also targeting 2029 completion. Two further links, EGL3 and EGL4,were approved by Ofgem in December 2025, with major supply contracts, including a £2 billion cable deal and a further roughly £3 billion of contracts announced in March 2026, signed in early 2026; neither is expected to be operational before the early 2030s. Together, the four Eastern Green Links will add new transmission capacity between Scotland and England, but the practical implication is that full relief from the Scotland-England bottleneck is still around five to eight years away, even with construction already under way on the first two. The National Audit Office reported in September 2026 that the transmission owners rate both links as on track but with significant risk. Battery storage deployment continues to accelerate, while National Grid has introduced a range of initiatives aimed at reducing constraint costs and making better use of existing network capacity. 

Some of these nearer-term fixes are already delivering measurable savings, Modo Energy reports that two such schemes, the Constraint Management Intertrip Service and the SO:TO Optimisation Trial, have already saved consumers £119 million and £268 million respectively, well before the Eastern Green Links are due to come online. As these investments come online, the expectation is that a growing share of renewable electricity will be able to reach consumers without requiring expensive intervention.

The balancing problem is real, but it is also a challenge the industry is actively working to solve. It is worth noting the scale of the gap that still needs closing. Even as the Eastern Green Links and shorter-term fixes progress, the pace of Scottish wind deployment is arguably outrunning them. According to Modo Energy and NESO current transmission upgrade plans project B4 boundary capacity nearly doubling to 7.3GW and the EC5 boundary tripling to 13.5GW by 2030. Yet the Scottish Government has set a target of 20GW of onshore wind capacity connected by the same date. On current trajectories, even after this wave of transmission investment lands, the wires may still not be able to keep up with the wind farms being built behind them.

In other words, many of the costs dominating today's headlines reflect a system that is still being built rather than the one Britain is ultimately trying to create. That does not mean those costs should be dismissed. Consumers are paying them today, and they deserve scrutiny. But they should also be judged against the economics of the system they are helping to build. A House of Lords Library briefing reports that the Climate Change Committee’s assessment estimates that a renewables-dominated electricity system could operate at a whole-system cost of between £55 and £73 per megawatt hour by 2035. This is based on the modelling of a fully decarbonised system that reliably meets demand even through a four-week "wind drought," with the range reflecting whether hydrogen production and storage costs are included. While precise figures will continue to evolve as technologies mature and infrastructure develops, studies using different methodologies increasingly reach the same conclusion: once the electricity system is fully built, a renewables-dominated grid is expected to cost less than one that remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels. The challenge Britain faces is not proving that outcome but bridging the gap between today's transitional costs and tomorrow's system. 

For comparison, the UK paid an average of around £204 per megawatt hour for electricity during the energy crisis in 2022, when gas prices dominated the market.

The question is not whether building a renewable electricity system costs money. Every energy system does. The real question is whether those upfront investments cost less than continuing to buy increasingly expensive fossil fuels year after year. At the moment, the evidence suggests they do. 

The Verdict

Perhaps the biggest mistake in the renewable energy debate is treating today's electricity system as though it were the finished product. It isn't.

Britain is in the middle of rebuilding the way it generates, transports and consumes electricity. Judging that transition solely by today's balancing costs is a little like judging a railway by the disruption caused while the tracks are still being laid. The temporary costs are highly visible. The long-term benefits are much harder to measure until the system is complete.

That does not mean success is guaranteed. Britain still has to build the transmission network, storage capacity and market reforms needed to make full use of its renewable resources. Delays will keep adding costs to consumers, and poor policy decisions could make the transition more expensive than it needs to be. But standing still carries its own costs.

Every year Britain remains dependent on fossil fuels, households remain exposed to forces they cannot control: wars, supply disruptions and global gas markets that have repeatedly demonstrated how quickly they can drive bills higher.

The debate, therefore, is no longer about whether renewable energy is perfect. No energy system is. It is about which set of risks Britain would rather live with: the predictable cost of building new infrastructure, or the unpredictable cost of buying fuel from increasingly volatile global markets. That is ultimately the choice shaping Britain's energy future.

Britain's energy bills are shaped by decisions made at a national level but households don't have to wait for those decisions to start saving money. Switchcraft compares energy tariffs across the market to find you a better deal and takes the hassle out of switching. While the grid catches up with the transition, make sure you are not overpaying for the energy it delivers today.

Frequently asked questions

Is renewable electricity cheaper than electricity from gas?


Wind and solar are now among the cheapest ways to generate electricity, and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero expects new offshore wind to cost less than new gas-fired power stations. Generating electricity is only part of the cost, though. Households also pay for the networks, balancing services and backup that any electricity system needs. Whether a renewable system is cheaper overall depends on those wider costs.

What is the difference between generation cost and whole-system cost?


Generation cost is the cost of producing one unit of electricity over a power station’s lifetime. Whole-system cost includes everything needed to deliver that electricity reliably at all times, such as transmission lines, reserve capacity and balancing. A gas system has system costs too, including pipelines, storage and capacity payments.

Why does Britain pay wind farms to switch off?


Much of the wind power is generated in Scotland, but the grid connecting Scotland and England cannot always carry it all. When too much electricity tries to cross the B6 boundary, NESO pays wind farms north of it to reduce output, and pays gas plants closer to demand to generate instead. Consumers fund both payments. In 2025 the cost was about £1.5 billion, and according to Octopus Energy the 2026 bill passed £1.5 billion on 5 October.

Will these costs come down?


They should fall as new transmission capacity is built. Eastern Green Link 1 and Eastern Green Link 2 are both targeting completion in 2029, although the National Audit Office reported in September 2026 that both are on track but with significant risk. NESO modelling shows that constraint costs in 2030 depend heavily on whether the planned grid upgrades are delivered on time.

Do renewables protect my bills from rising gas prices?


Partly. Under the Contracts for Difference scheme, many renewable generators sell at a fixed price, so they are not exposed to gas prices. However, wholesale gas prices still influence what everyone pays, which is why Ofgem raised the price cap by 4% for October to December 2026 because of higher gas prices linked to the conflict in the Middle East.

How much do constraint costs add to my energy bill?


Ofgem estimated that constraint costs added around £15 to the average household bill in 2025. The network upgrades designed to reduce those costs are expected to add around £60 per year by 2030.

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